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PILOT FATIGUE: UNRESPONSIVE FEDERAL AVIATION
REGULATIONS AND INCREASING COCKPIT
TECHNOLOGY THREATEN TO ROCK THE NATION'S
PILOTS TO SLEEP AND COMPROMISE
CONSUMER SAFETY
TEMESHA EVANS-DAVIS*
As cockpit technology and automation advance and crews endure
longer flights over more time zones, the problem of pilot fatigue is grow-
ing ever more serious. According to a NASA study, more airline pilots
are falling asleep at the wheel due to this improved technology and an
increased demand for flights. The resulting paradox is becoming dan-
gerously clear. While the technology allows pilots tofly long distances for
great durations, their bodies remain programmed to be awake during the
day and asleep at night. To reconcile modern aviation capability and
pilots' very human and biological need for sleep, the FAA began a cam-
paign under the Reagan Administration to bring old regulations in line
with current usage and technology. The results have been unsatisfactory
to pilots, and representatives of pilots' unions have exhorted the FAA to
take immediate action to deal with the problem of pilot fatigue. The
aviation industry has voluntarily abolished Warsaw Convention liabil-
ity limitations while NASA has released its fatigue countermeasures
studies that encourage controlled napping. But, the proposed 1995 reg-
ulations remain unenacted. Furthermore, regulatory agencies for both
trucking and railway industries have begun to directly address fatigue
and possible regulatory changes. The time has come for the aviation
industry to follow suit.
I. INTRODUCTION
WA1EN A PLANE rolls down the runway, the pilot at the con-
ltrols is "most likely well trained, wide awake, and alert. But
* Temesha Evans-Davis graduated from Southern Methodist University in May
of 2000. She was a Sarah T. Hughes Scholar. After clerking next year for the
Honorable Carl E. Stewart, Judge, Fifth Circuit, she will join Worsham, Forsythe
and Wooldridge as an associate.
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what happens once the plane reaches cruising altitude? An
ongoing NASA study confirms a long held cockpit secret-on
perhaps one in seven flights, [the] pilot falls asleep."1 Just as
passengers on long airline flights get comfortable, lean back,
and doze off to sleep, pilots, responding to their bodies' pres-
sure for sleep, could be doing the same thing.'
"Sleep is . . . simply a symptom of fatigue."3 According to
NASA research, improved technology and increased demand
for flights are causing the fatigue that is driving pilots to fall
asleep at the wheel.4 Pilots are currently banned from napping
or taking mid-flight walks, except to use the restroom, and they
"must endure more transcontinental flights with little to do at
cruising altitudes."5 John McCulloch, a retired airline pilot with
thirty years of service to Eastern Airlines, summed up the phe-
nomenon as follows: 'You're just sitting up there .... It could
get a little boring. The autopilot's doing all the work. You could
just sort of doze."6
The problem of pilot fatigue is growing ever more serious be-
cause continued cockpit technology and automation advances
facilitate longer flights over more time zones.7 A greater
number of frequent fliers than ever and an insufficient supply of
pilots to meet these growing flight demands only exacerbate the
problem.8 At a certain point, the body takes over and forces the
pilot to fall asleep. It is an involuntary response. 9
I CNN The World Today: Sleeping Pilots May Be Putting Lives in Danger (CNN tele-
vision broadcast, June 23, 1998).
2 See CNN Science and Technology Week (CNN television broadcast, June 27,
1998).
3 Id.
4 See Overseas Travel News in Brief AAP NEWSEED, June 25, 1998.
5 Id.
6 Martin Merzer, I in 7 Pilots Falling Asleep on Job, Studies Suggest, SUNDAY GA-
ZE-rrE MAIL, June 21, 1998, at PIA.
7 See Martin Merzer, The Risks of Fatigue-Many Pilots Catch Shut-Eye on the Job,
THE SEATrLE TiMES, June 23, 1998, at A2.
8 See Eric Brazil, Study: OK for Pilots to Nap; Blames Airlines, FAA for Not Changing
Regulations, SAN FRANCIsco EXAMINER, June 23, 1998, at A6 (quoting the head of
NASA's pilot fatigue program: "Pilots are just as susceptible to jet lag as
passengers.").
9 See Merzer, supra note 7, at A2. Jim Bishop, a veteran pilot, acknowledged
that he nods off on rare occasions. According to Mark Rosekine, a psychologist
who conducted several pilot fatigue studies for NASA and the FAA, Bishop's re-
sponse simply illustrates that fatigue plays a significant role in aviation. Although




The most significant concern this involuntary sleep response
raises is its effect on safety. Since NASA instituted the Aviation
Safety Reporting System (ASRS) in 1976, the United States "gov-
ernment has documented hundreds of fatigue-related incidents,
including many cases where pilots fell asleep at the controls."1"
Unfortunately, the FAA has suppressed or ignored this data
under pressure from cost-conscious airlines.1' Before making
an analysis of the possible fatigue related safety ramifications,
this section will explore fatigue and the regulations that the FAA
enacted to address pilot fatigue.
A. FATIGUE
Sleep is a "period of diminished responsiveness to external
stimuli [that] alternates with wakefulness on a daily basis."12 It is
a "basic human need."' Like hunger and thirst, sleepiness is
considered a visceral drive that reflects the need or pressure for
sleep.14
Several factors affect people's ability to accurately judge their
degree of sleepiness: an internal point of reference, environ-
mental demands, and time of day. "[I] n boring, nonstimulating
situations in which environmental demands to stay alert or to
pay attention are reduced," people often judge their level of
sleepiness to be higher.1 5 "People with a high degree of sleepi-
ness . . . fall asleep rapidly when given the opportunity to
sleep. 1 6
Problems arise when sleepy people are not given adequate op-
portunities to sleep. The dramatic effects of sleep deprivation,
loss of initiative, loss of energy, lapses of attention, distractibility,
and the overwhelming agony of wanting to go to sleep no matter
what is being done, reveal the importance of adequate sleep. 7
Although these symptoms are undeniable monikers of sleep
deprivation, science remains uncertain about what the real func-
10 David 0. Hill, Facts on Flying Fatigue, COM. APPEAL, June 28, 1998, at B7.
I1 See id.
12 Kathryn A. Lee, An Overview of Sleep and Common Sleep Problems; Continuing
Education, With Test; Monograph on Sleep Issues, 24 ANNAJ. 614 (1997).
13 Id.
14 See Thomas Roth & Timothy Roehrs, Alcohol-Induced Sleepiness and Memory
Function, 19 ALCOHOL HEALTH & RES. WORLD 130 (1995).
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 See Ethel Gofen, Sleep: More Than Meets the Shut-Eye, 17 CuRRENT HEALTH 2, 4
(1991).
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tion of sleep is.18 Intuitively, however, people know that "sleep-
ing, like drinking and eating, returns [them] to a physiological
even keel when [they] feel out of sorts."' 9
Though science is uncertain about what sleep does, it is cer-
tain how sleep occurs. Biological rhythms control sleep.2° Eve-
ryone has a personal circadian rhythm that controls sleep.2'
Therefore, each individual has regular sleep and wake patterns
that affect fatigue.22
Although the body's circadian rhythm influences sleep depri-
vation, it is not the only factor that contributes to fatigue. Living
and working conditions can cause fatigue. In addition, stress,
workload, and insufficient time off may fatigue people.28
Sleep deprivation can inflict damage beyond mere fatigue. It
causes mental acuity to decline,24 darkens moods, and impairs
concentration, memory, and decision making ability. 25 Finally,
in extreme instances, sleep deprivation can be fatal.26
B. TECHNOLOGY AND AUTOMATION
The traditional analog instrumentation board currently in
cockpits is being steadily replaced. "Modern airline transports
[now] equipped with electronic flight and engine system instru-
mentation" are referred to as "glass cockpits." 27 As automation
18 See Anna Maria Gillis, Why Sleep? A New Hypothesis Suggests That We Sleep to
Refuel Energy Stores in the Brain, 46 BIOSCIENCE 391 (1996) ("[M]odern researchers
are, at the most fundamental level, as confounded by the purpose and ultimate
control of sleep as were Hippocrates and Aristotle more than 2500 years ago.").
19 Id.
20 See Daniel Goleman, Too Little, Too Late; Sleep, 11 AM. HEALTH 43 (1992).
21 See Gofen, supra note 17, at 4.
22 See Douglas B. Stevenson, Tanker Crew Fatigue: Some New Solutions to an Old
Problem, 27J. MAR. L. & CoM. 453, 454 (1996).
23 See id. ("[E]xcessive mental workload, such as where a crew member has too
many things to attend to a once, can cause mental overload. Monotonous tasks,
on the other hand, can produce boredom, inattention, and fatigue. It should be
noted that excessive time spent on any task, whether high activity or monoto-
nous, produces inattention and fatigue.").
24 See Gillis, supra note 18, at 391.
25 See Goleman, supra note 20, at 43.
26 See Gillis, supra note 18, at 391. Allan Rechtschaffen and colleagues of the
University of Chicago showed that rats, deprived of sleep, experienced a doub-
ling of their metabolic rates. Although the sleep deprived rats ate more than rats
allowed to sleep normally, the sleep-deprived animals lost weight. They could
not maintain their body temperatures, and they developed unusual skin disor-
ders. After two and a half weeks, the rats died. See id.
27 Edward H. Phillips, Data Recorders Crucial to State-of-Art Crash Probes, AVIATION
WK. & SPACE TECH., Feb. 1995, at 56.
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efforts and technology continue, the seemingly futuristic direc-
tive from a pilot to his plane: "Follow the highway down onto
final approach and land, taxi to the indicated spot, and shut
down," is getting closer to becoming an aviation reality.28 "Vir-
tually all the technology is already developed, or can be in a very
short time .... 29
"Computer-driven instruments, flight management systems,
complex digital data buses [sic] and microprocessor-controlled
components possess superior technologies to [their predeces-
sor] analog systems." ° Now those technologies are being up-
graded and extended as the civil aircraft industry stands "on the
brink of a huge step into the next generation of automation"-
autonomous aircraft operations.3 1 Faced with a doubling of air
traffic over the next ten to fifteen years, the aviation industry
simply has no other means to manage such growth. 2
Automation has been a tremendous boom and without it,
meeting the passenger capacity demands of the future would be
impossible.33 However, concern is growing among the airline
industry that the application of present flight deck automated
systems still has some major flaws. Detailed evaluations of the
long-term impact of automation in the cockpit are only now be-
coming clear, and because the new generation of digital
datalinks could take the pilot "even further out of the decision
making loop, it is critical that the problem solving is done
sooner rather than later. ' 34 Solving the problems of cockpit
automation is a definite priority because pilots are distrustful of
advanced technology aircrafts.35
Airbus Industries has taken the position that training is piv-
otal in helping pilots remain comfortable while making the tran-
sition from conventional-technology aircrafts to automated
cockpits. 6 Airbus believes that a pragmatic approach to auto-
28 Jeffrey L. Ethell, NASA's Blueprint for a General Aviation Renaissance, AERO-
SPACE AM., October 1994, at 38.
29 Id.
30 Phillips, supra note 27, at 56.
31 Philip Butterworth-Hayes, Time to Reconsider Automation, AEROSPACE AM.,




35 See id. (referring to the U.K. RAF Institute of Aviation Medicine study on
pilot comfort with automated cockpit technology).
36 See France Toulouse, Airbus Restructures CRM Training, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECH., Sept. 1996, at 133.
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mation is essential to its training. Rather than insist on the full
use of automation, it prefers that trainees select the most appro-
priate level of information and automation. 7
"Lack of understanding or excessive confidence in automa-
tion" contributes to incidents and accidents." Pilots frequently
lose a "situational awareness" or fail to shift their "mental map"
when dealing with automated cockpits. 9 Developing a training
program to address this mental map deficiency is more difficult
than devising a solution for technical errors. One captain of a
Boeing glass cockpit aircraft captured the automation dichot-
omy when he lauded the airplane's modern computerized tech-
nology, but also said that pilots must guard against over-
dependence and automation complacency. "'Ninety-nine per-
cent of the technology makes flying safer, but you have to be
aware of the one percent that can kill you.' "40
In addition to gaining a mental map of automation, pilots fly-
ing in glass cockpits need to improve their flying skills. This
need is a "crucial but often overlooked factor in reducing acci-
dents."41 Threats of aircraft accidents are not prevented simply
by investing in technology, but by investing in people as well.42
Although other airlines have developed training programs to
address automation, American Airlines' Advanced Aircraft Ma-
neuvering Program (AAMP) is the most comprehensive. It was
developed in early 1995 and focuses primarily on "raising a pi-
lot's level of knowledge and awareness of aerodynamics, unusual
altitude recoveries, phenomena that can cause aircraft upsets
and automation dependency in the cockpit. ' 43 "AAMP 'is built
on the philosophy that the pilot must always fly the airplane




40 Airbus Challenges "Negative Assessment" of Glass Cockpits, AIR SAFETY WK., Nov.
1997 (quoting the captain of a glass cockpit Boeing aircraft).
41 Edward H. Phillips, Program Underscores Need for Improved Flying Skills, 146 AVI-
ATION WK. & SPACE TECH., June 1997, at 35.
42 See id. According to Robert W. Baker, American's executive vice president
of operations, an airline program "seeks to reassign the appropriate role of air-
craft automation within the cockpit, recognizing that ultimately, it will be the





the pilot: not the technical pilot, not the test pilot, but the line
pilot.' ""
This idiom encompasses two safety concerns applicable to
automation and piloting. First, pilots must decide when and
how much automation to use. After all, "[w] hat do the airlines
want-a proficient pilot, or a pilot proficient in orchestrating
automated systems? '4 5 Second, airlines must redirect crew re-
source management to address pilots' "interface with automa-
tion and what the appropriate level of automation should be for
specific cockpit tasks."46
Operators espoused this conservative attitude towards cockpit
automation loud and clear when Boeing decided to update the
737 platform.47 While improved operating characteristics are
necessary, the idea is that technology must earn its way onto the
airplane.48
Airbus obviously believes technology has earned its way on
board because it designed the A320 during the second wave of
the revolution in cockpit technology. 49 The first glass cockpit
aircrafts were revised analogs of the conventional cockpit and
had only enough automation to reduce the size and complexity
of the switch panels. 50 But "[t]he A320 exploited the computer
revolution and used a higher level of automation .. . to reduce
workload during both routine and emergency procedures."'"
Apart from the Concorde, the A320 was the first commercial
aircraft to use "fly-by-wire controls" and thereby eliminate the
need for two-handed mechanical leverage. 2 Airbus replaced the
conventional control yoke with force-sensitive sidesticks that
move only when a pilot moves them. Did Airbus make the A320
too automated?53




47 See generally, Perry Flint, A Dynasty of Success: The 737 Is Still Near the Top of Its
Form, AIR TRAsP. WORLD, Feb. 1994, at 58 ("Yes, by all means update the 737
platform, but don't build an all-new airplane. Don't fiddle with the cockpit any
more than is necessary.").
48 See id.
49 See Bill Sweetman, Rough Takeoff Smooth Cruise; Accidents Inspire New Training
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Boeing, not surprisingly, has no formal comment. Its 777 has
yokes, not sidesticks. Automation on the 777 cockpit is driven
by three basic principles: (1) long-term monitoring is automated
because humans are bad monitors; (2) some actions are auto-
mated because the crew would have a Hobson's choice; and (3)
the pilot needs to control what appears on the displays.54
Some agree with Airbus's more expansive and liberal view of
automation. A 1994 industry task force report stated:
" [w] ithout innovation enabled by technological advancement,
general aviation within the U.S. will fail to respond to opportu-
nity for expanded use."" Using people who had never flown
before, NASA ran a pilot simulator program to test "EZ Fly/
Highway in the Sky" single power levers. Researchers found that
ninety percent of the participants were able to take off, fly a pat-
tern, and land the very first time at the control.56 From a practi-
cal standpoint, the single power lever technology could be used
to facilitate lesser-experienced pilots by removing "[m]uch of
the grind and sweat of instrument flight rules. 57
The more accurate view of cockpit automation lies some-
where between the extreme absolute conservative and liberal
perspectives. Prompted by the reality of accidents and incidents
involving transport aircraft with advanced or highly automated
systems, the FAA launched a study of human factors to deter-
mine how breakdowns in the pilot/aircraft interface affect
safety.5" The FAA proposed an airworthiness directive against
several Airbus series aircraft to modify certain flight control
computers. These modifications would allow the autopilot to
disengage when the aircraft is attempting a "go-around"
maneuver.
59
According to surveys and research on the influence of human
factors on glass cockpit safety, many experienced pilots of auto-
54 See id. Hobson's choice is an apparently free choice when there is no real
alternative. See MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 551 (10th ed. 1994).
Hobson's choice example: "if one pressurization controller fails, the only action
is to switch to the second controller." Id.
55 Ethell, supra note 28, at 38.
56 See id.
57 Id. This system would safely place 1,000 hour capability in the hands of a
pilot with only 200 hours experience. The pilot would not need the judgment of
a 1,000 hour pilot because, through expert systems in the cockpit, certain aspects
of experience could be built in. See id.
58 See Edward H. Phillips, FAA to Study Human Factors, AVIATION WK. & SPACE




mated aircraft are occasionally surprised by what the automatic
systems are doing.6 ° Earl L. Wiener, a human factors re-
searcher, says pilots in automated cockpits often ask: "What is it
(the auto-flight system) doing? Why did it do that? What is it
going to do next?" 61 Human factors researchers David D.
Woods and Nadine B. Sarter believe these inquiries show that
pilots simply do not always "have a good 'mental model' of what
computerized flight systems are up to in all circumstances. "62These findings suggest that glass-cockpit designs have not al-
ways improved on previous-generation systems.6" In fact, design-
ers and researchers should have used pilots to test new glass-
cockpit engine displays in imparting information to the crew.
Since this testing was not done, breakdowns in communication
between the pilots and automated systems is occurring as com-
puters are becoming more complex and usurping more author-
ity in the cockpit.64 These problems must be addressed because
the potential harm is tremendous.65
C. REGULATION
Automation and technology cannot, and arguably should not,
be eliminated. But when modern day aviation innovation col-
lides with man's circadian clock, progress meets a substantially
limiting factor. Through regulation, the FAA has been trying to
balance these two competing interests for decades. Not all the
parties concerned, however, have met those regulations with
open arms.
In 1982, the FAA made a push under the Reagan Administra-
tion's regulatory policy to bring outdated regulations in line
with current usage and technology.66 The proposed rules were
an attempt to revise the then thirty-year-old hour limitations to
safely regulate the growing air transportation industry. Sug-
- See David Hughes & Michael A. Dornheim, Accidents Direct Focus on Cockpit
Automation, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Jan. 1995, at 52.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 See id. ("[N]ew engine displays did not necessarily represent an improve-
ment over the round-dial displays used in older 737s.").
64 See id.
65 See id. ("Woods and Sarter note that 'strong, silent, difficult-to-direct auto-
mation is not a team player [with the flight crew].' Wiener says some glass cock-
pits have clumsy automation that creates bottlenecks when pilots are least able to
deal with them-during high-workload periods.").
6 See David M. North, FAA Moves to Simplify, Update Aviation Regulations, AvIA-
TION WK. & SPACE TECH., Mar. 1982, at 40.
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gested flight time regulations included the following: a 100 hour
limitation on commercial flight time in any thirty consecutive
days; a mandate that within any twenty-four consecutive hours,
the required rest period must be at least eight consecutive hours
for scheduled flight times of eight hours or less, and ten consec-
utive hours for scheduled flight times of more than eight hours;
and a requirement that a certificate holder provide each flight
crew member with a rest period of at least twenty-four consecu-
tive hours once during any seven consecutive days.67
Pilots and some commuter airlines opposed implementation
of these proposed regulations. 68 They particularly disagreed
with the 100-hour monthly flight time maximum. For them, the
FAA proposal just went far beyond what was necessary to solve a
basic airline problem. 69
The FAA rebutted that the changes were needed since the
current rules were drafted three decades earlier when piston air-
craft predominated. "'Modern aircraft with turbine engines
and other technological advances provide a more comfortable
work environment to the flight-deck crew and more flexibility in
selecting operating altitudes and speeds .... Yet the regulations
governing flight time limits have remained unchanged. The
present regulations are enormously complicated and de-
tailed.'"70 Opponents then discussed how the operating envi-
ronment had changed and become more tiring.71
To address this issue of fatigue, the Air Line Pilots Association
(ALPA) emphasized hours on duty as opposed to only flight
hours. Since modern aircraft, with their high speeds and sophis-
ticated monitoring systems, can demand that pilots give more
complete attention, regulating flight hours is an understandable
instinct. 72 Pilots, however, want the FAA to recognize that, "'[i]f
67 See id. (noting that the rest time was to be assigned based on scheduled
rather than actual time flown, and it was not to include "deadhead"
transportation).
68 See Michael Feazel, Duty Time Changes Drawing Fire, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECH., Jul. 1982, at 28.
- See id.
70 Id. (quoting the FAA).
71 See id. Despite modern aircraft, pilots must deal with more traffic today,
operating speeds are higher, and airlines often contend with weather that would




a person is on duty for [twelve hours] he will get tired whether
he is doing much flying or not.'71
Although the 1982 proposed rules did not pass, in 1985 the
FAA did manage to establish flight time limitations and rest re-
quirements for domestic air carrier and regional airline pilots.74
ALPA called the new rules "a major improvement" over the old
rules dating back to the 1930's. Pilots liked the guaranteed min-
imum nine hour rest between trips, the tightened pilot flying
limits for commuter carriers, and the preservation of the cur-
rent daily, weekly, monthly and annual flight time limitations.75
Unfortunately, the 1930's rules still govern international opera-
tions because these regulations do not cover them.76
Although the 1985 amended rules addressed a number of sig-
nificant issues, they did not completely solve flight time and rest
requirement problems.77 In particular, the complexity of the
rules and inconsistencies between the various operations under
parts 121 and 135 continued to make application and interpre-
tation burdensome. 78 This led ALPA to petition the FAA to
amend domestic flight time limits and rest requirements for
cockpit crews in 1990.7' The proposed amendments would have
increased the minimum rest period for flight crews scheduled to
fly less than eight hours in a twenty-four hour period to ten
hours, eight of which would be required to be in a rest facility.
For crew members scheduled to fly eight hours or more, or who
make eight landings in a twenty-four hour period, the rest time
would increase to twelve hours, ten of which would be mandated
to be in a rest facility. 0
The union additionally requested a fourteen-hour duty limit
in any consecutive twenty-four hour period and one calendar
73 Id. (quoting Bruce Woodruff, chairman of the ALPA's flight-duty time
committee).
74 See generally, David M. North, FAA's New Right-Time Limitations Fail to Satisfy
Transport Operaters, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., July 1985, at 32.
75 See id. (stating the newly established limits for pilots flying in part 135 com-
muter operations are 1,200 hours in any calendar year, 120 hours per month and
34 hours for any seven consecutive days).
76 See id.
77 See Flight Crew member Duty Period Limitations, Flight Time Limitations
and Rest Requirements, 60 Fed. Reg. 65,951, 65,952 (1995) (to be codified at 14
C.F.R. pts. 121 and 135) (proposed Dec. 20, 1995).
78 See id. at 65,952-53.
79 See ALPA Wants Changes in Fight/Rest Requirement, AVIATION DAILY, July 1990,
at 169 [hereinafter ALPA Wants].
80 See id.
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day free of duty every seven calendar days. It also told the FAA
that airlines should be prohibited from interrupting that day or
any other rest period."' As authority for these demands, ALPA
cited a NASA study of short-haul air transport operations and
"other scientific information" demonstrating that current rest
requirements are not adequate to prevent flight crew member
fatigue, an FAA long-recognized fundamental factor of flight
safety. 82
Since the 1985 flight limitation rules, "'many air carriers have
been scheduling reduced rest every other day, which is causing
both short- and long-term fatigue among air carrier pilots."' 83
Although air carriers claim that delays and late arrivals precipi-
tate the need for operational flexibility and forces them to use
the reduced rest provisions, the scheduling, though technically
legal, is inapposite the purpose of the rules.84 Such normal
scheduling use of the reduced rest provisions leaves pilots with
significantly less time to rest than they need to avoid fatigue.85
The results of this reduced rest scheduling are staggering. Ac-
cording to a union survey, eighty-six percent of pilots were pro-
vided less than eight hours rest from one to nine times per
month. In addition, eighty-seven percent report actually flying
more than eight hours between rest periods anywhere from one
to nine times per month. Finally, eighty-one percent of these
pilots exceeded sixteen hours of duty time during a twenty-four
hour period from one to nine times a month.86
In December of 1995, the Department of Transportation
(DOT) and FAA responded to ALPA requests for new regula-
tions. The FAA proposed amendments to establish one set of
regulations for flight crew members engaged in air transporta-
81 See id.
82 See id.
83 Id. (quoting ALPA).
84 See id. ("[I] t is contrary to the spirit of the regulations to use the reduced
rest provision as a normal scheduling goal") (quoting ALPA).
85 See ALPA Wants, supra note 79, at 169 ("ALPA, citing a NASA study of the
effects on sleep of commercial short-haul flight operations, said that pilots need
to relax prior to going to sleep after a day of flying, 'and when they do go to
sleep, it takes them, on average, half an hour longer to actually fall asleep. When
pilots are subjected to a minimum rest period of eight hours, considering their
travel time to and from a rest facility, time required to eat and attend to other
physiological needs, and time required to actually fall asleep, they will be lucky to




tion.87 The objective of this proposal was to contribute to im-
proved safety by providing guidelines that ensured flight crew
members adequate opportunity to obtain the rest required to
perform their routine and emergency duties.88
These regulations were inspired by the nature of the aviation
industry and recent scientific findings relating fatigue to per-
formance. Specifically, the aviation industry must operate
twenty-four hours a day, every day of the year to meet global
long haul, regional, overnight cargo, and short-haul domestic
demands.8 9 Thus, both domestic and international aviation re-
quire crossing multiple time zones that necessitates irregular
work schedules for flight crew members.90
Over the last several decades, scientific knowledge about cir-
cadian physiology, fatigue, and performance decrements has
confirmed that flight and duty practices have caused aviators to
experience performance-impairing fatigue from sleep loss or
deprivation. 91 "Safely flying large groups of people six miles
above the earth at nearly the speed of sound leaves little margin
for error,"92 and crew fatigue is arguably "'the single most criti-
cal safety issue in today's ... airline environment.'-93 Therefore,
the FAA's belief that incorporating scientific information on fa-
tigue and human sleep physiology into regulations on flight
crew scheduling is critical to help maintain safety and facilitate
optimum crew performance during flights is completely
understandable.94
NASA generated some of the scientific data and information
the FAA used to form appropriate duty and rest regulations. In
1980 NASA created a Fatigue/Jet Lag Program to examine
whether transmeridian flying and fatigue, in association with
87 See Flight Crew member Duty Period Limitations, Flight Time Limitations
and Rest Requirements, 60 Fed. Reg. 65,951 (1995) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R.





92 Byron Acohido, Boeing's 737 Is at the Center of a Debate Over Safety, SEATTLE
TIMES, Oct. 30, 1996, at Al.
93 Congress Continues to Explore Flight and Duty Time, AVIATION DAILY, Apr. 3,
1992, at RA4 (quoting John O'Brien, director of engineering and air safety for
ALPA).
94 See Flight Crew member Duty Period Limitations, Flight Time Limitations
and Rest Requirements, 60 Fed. Reg. 65,951 (1995) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R.
pts. 121 and 135) (proposed Dec. 20, 1995).
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various factors found in air transport, caused safety problems.15
The program has pursued three goals: "(1) to determine the
extent of fatigue, sleep loss, and circadian disruption in both
domestic and international flight operations; (2) to determine
the impact of these factors on flight crew performance; and (3)
to develop and evaluate countermeasures to reduce the adverse
effects of these factors and improve flight crew performance and
alertness."96
In addition to NASA's research efforts, which helped define
the scope of the proposed flight, duty, and rest regulations, the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), prompted by the
August 18, 1993, Douglas DC-8-61 freighter crash, made its own
recommendations concerning issues of fatigue.97 NTSB con-
cluded that the accident occurred because the extended flight
was allowed by combining applicable part 121 and 135 flight
and duty rules.98 Although this is the only accident specifically
attributed to pilot error or fatigue,99 NTSB candidly recounted
the circumstances of the incident 00 and quickly responded with
the following safety recommendations for flight and duty time
limits:
(1) Revise part 121 to require that flight time accumulated in
noncommercial "tail end" ferry flights conducted under part 91,
as a result of 14 CFR, part 121, revenue flights, be included in the
flight crew member's total flight and duty time accrued during
those revenue operations. (A-94-105)
(2) Expedite the review and upgrade of flight/duty time limita-
tions of the Federal Aviation Regulations to ensure that they in-
95 See id. at 65,953.
96 Id.
97 See id. at 65,954
98 See id. ("The NTSB concluded that 'the accident trip was under the provi-
sions of a combination of separate regulations that allowed extended flight and
duty times to be scheduled, contrary to safe operating practices.'").
- See Introduction to the Regulatory Plan and Unified Agenda of Federal Reg-
ulatory and Deregulatory Actions, 62 Fed. Reg. 57,003, 57,123 (1997).
100 See Pilot Groups Close Ranks to Examine Proposed Duty/Rest Limits, AVIATION
DAiLY, Jan. 25, 1996, at 122. ("The pilots had been on duty for 18 hours and had
been flying for nine hours prior to the crash. The crew was operating on what is
referred to as the back side of the clock - flights that start or continue through
normal sleeping hours."); see also, Flight Crew member Duty Period Limitations,
Flight Time Limitations and Rest Requirements, 60 Fed. Reg. 65,951, 65,954
(1995) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 121 and 135) (proposed Dec. 20, 1995)
("NTSB determined that among the probable causes of this accident were im-
paired judgment, impaired decision-making, and impaired flying abilities of the
captain and flightcrew due to the effects of fatigue.").
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corporate the results of the latest research on fatigue and sleep
issues. (A-94-106). 1° '
The NTSB recommendations were among many that the FAA
considered before making its proposed amendments. 10 2 In es-
sence, the proposal was drafted to eliminate the differences be-
tween part 121 and part 135 flight time limitations and rest
requirements for domestic, flag, supplemental, commuter, and
on-demand operations. 10 3 The proposal was a preventative mea-
sure, not specifically in response to any particular incident, to
address the potential safety problems associated with fatigue-
based performance decrements.
To remove ambiguity and unify the terms used in both part
121 and part 135 regulations, the proposal clarified several defi-
nitions. The FAA defined four kinds of time: assigned time,
duty involving flight time ("duty period"), reserve time, and rest
("rest period").1°4 Since the United States was one of only two
countries in the world to base regulation of aviation hours of
service regulations on flight time rather than duty time or a
combination of the two, 105 the proposal painstakingly detailed
"duty period is not solely a function of whether the aircraft is
airborne."'0 6 Finally, based on NASA Recommendation 2.3.6,
10, Flight Crew member Duty Period Limitations, 60 Fed. Reg. at 65,954.
102 See id. at 65,954-55. The Air Transport Association of America (ATA) peti-
tioned the FAA to amend part 121, Subpart R, which governs flight time limita-
tions for flag operations. ALPA petitioned to delete the reduced rest provisions
and to increase the required minimum rest for flight crew members. Thomas T.
Gasta, a turbo-jet aircraft captain, petitioned for a definition of "rest" that would
protect crew members from being contacted to work by ensuring the period is
free from restraint and responsibility for work. His particular concern was to
specify that "reserve time" not be considered "rest." See id.
103 See id. at 65,955.
104 See id. at 65,956. "Assigned time" is time the flight crew member is assigned
to activities other than flight duties and may be performed as part of a "duty
period." "Duty period" is the period of elapsed time between reporting for an
assignment involving flight time and release from that assignment. "Reserve
time" is any period of time when a flight crew member must be available to re-
port upon notice for a duty period. "Rest period" is any time period free from all
restraint or duty and free of all responsibility for work or duty should the occa-
sion arise. See id.
105 See id. at 65,954 (noting that France is the only other country in the world
to use aviation hours as opposed to duty time).
106 Flight Crew member Duty Period Limitations, 60 Fed. Reg. at 65,656. The
proposal explained that a typical duty period would consist of pre-flight duties
and post-flight duties. Although aircraft carriers vary in how early they require
flight crew members to check in to begin duty, typically 30 minutes to one hour
before scheduled departure is required. In addition, flight crew members are
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the proposal recognized that the use of additional flight crew
members justifies longer duty periods if flight crew members
have on-duty sleep opportunities.1 °7 Table 1 summarizes the
proposed limitations on duty time and flight time and proposed
pilot rest requirements.
Although the 1985 regulations covered duty time, they did
not specifically address reserve time. Two types of reserve as-
signments developed in the aviation industry: "standby reserve"
and "reserve time." Essentially, standby reserve is equivalent to
duty period and would be treated accordingly for purposes of
limitation and rest requirements. Reserve time is considered
neither rest period nor duty period nor assigned time and there-
fore was dealt with separately under the proposal.1 0 8
The proposal acknowledged the difficulty of trying to predict
when an individual flight crew member is asleep and awake, so it
did not base notice requirements on such individualized factors.
Instead, the FAA placed emphasis on flight crew members re-
ceiving adequate notice to provide an opportunity for rest
before the assigned duty period.' Two approaches to reserve
time assignment developed with adequate notice as their focus.
Though the approaches share notice as a primary theme, they
do not provide for an equal number of rest hours.110 NASA rec-
ommended providing a "predictable" protected eight-hour
sleep opportunity, but the FAA was satisfied that the provisions
would provide at least an opportunity for crew members to get
eight hours of rest. 1 '
In addition to adequate notice provisions, the FAA was con-
cerned with duty period extension. The 1985 flight time rules
stated:
[A] flight crew member is not considered to be scheduled for
flight time in excess of the flight time limitations if the flights to
which he or she is assigned normally terminate within the limita-
generally required to remain on duty after the aircraft arrives at the gate to com-
plete post-flight duties before they are relieved of duty. See id.
107 See id. at 65,957.
108 See id. at 65,959.
109 See id. at 65,959-60.
110 See Flight Crew member Duty Period Limitations, 60 Fed. Reg. at 65,960.
For a 14-hour duty period, a crew member must receive 10 hours of notification
and if the requisite 10 hour notice is not given, the duty period length must be
reduced. The second approach provides a minimum 6-hour period of protected
time for each 24 hours of reserve time during which the flight crew member




tions, but due to circumstances beyond the control of the certifi-
cate holder (such as adverse weather conditions) are not at block
out time expected to reach their destination within the sched-
uled time. These requirements do not specify a limit to the flight
time extensions under these circumstances.'1 2
According to this language, airlines could theoretically extend
duty periods for unlimited periods of time so long as opera-
tional causes beyond the control of the air carrier like weather,
mechanical problems, and Air Traffic Control situations were
the culprits. NASA found this unacceptable, because unlimited
extended duty time was "one of the major fatigue related
problems with . . . flight crew member assignments."' 3 The
FAA, therefore, proposed to limit the amount of time that a
duty period may be extended irrespective of the type of delay.
Regarding rest periods, the FAA retained some of the rules in
existing regulations. Specifically, no aircraft carrier may assign
any flight crew member and "no flight crew member may accept
any duty period or flight time with the certificate holder unless
the flight crew member has had at least the minimum rest pe-
riod required."' The proposal went even further by suggesting
that aircraft carriers could not make any duty assignments dur-
ing required rest periods. Further illustrating the importance of
rest periods, the proposal stated that a flight crew member not
serving in assigned time, reserve time, standby duty or a duty
period, was in a rest period."'
II. LIABILITY LIMITS
As the FAA and the aviation industry continued their commit-
ment to optimizing safety by minimizing the effects of pilot fa-
tigue, the industry made a bold leap that may potentially upset
this delicate balance. Airline officials from some of the nation's
largest air carriers were concerned that they had been unfairly
blamed for resisting regulations since they say safety has always
been first, having adopted a "[d] o it yourself' approach to avia-
tion safety. 116 Although this "'shift in the culture"' could be "'a
112 Id. at 65,961.
113 Id.
114 Flight Crew member Duty Period Limitations, 60 Fed. Reg. at 65,962.
115 See id.
116 J. Lynn Lunsford, Airlines Take Initiative for Safer Flying Carriers Make Improve-
ments Without Prodding from FAA, DALiLAs MORNING NEws, Apr. 5, 1998, at 1A.
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very positive trend,"' the FAA must remember that it is "'the
government's responsibility to ensure public safety." 117
This cautious optimism or, perhaps, thinly veiled skepticism
may be attributed to the history of "airline-influenced" regula-
tions. The regulatory language often served a less than altruistic
purpose for the aviation industry.11 Critics assert that the avia-
tion industry is merely acting on self-serving motivations to de-
crease possible civil liability for future accidents or even
attempting to avoid potentially stricter regulations. 19
Whatever the airlines' reasons for self-imposed safety stan-
dards and procedures, they must realize that safety improve-
ments simply make sense and can add to the bottom line. This
realization is particularly important to air carriers because, as
Robert Baker, Executive Vice-President for Operations at Ameri-
can Airlines, stated, "the public is very intolerant of circum-
stances and things that could have been prevented. 1 20
This idea of public intolerance for preventable circumstances
is one factor that the airlines should consider in light of the in-
dustry's proposed elimination of limited liability under the War-
saw Convention. Beginning in 1933, the Warsaw Convention
provided a workable means to assure families of crash victims
the certainty of obtaining financial recoveries while giving the
airline industry, then in its infancy, the security of being able to
meet all of its liabilities. 121 Because the 1933 liability limiting
provisions did not contain a mechanism to account for inflation,
they were amended. The resulting 1966 Montreal Agreement
was a "special contract" between airlines operating in the United
States and their international passengers to raise the liability
117 Id. (quoting Jim Hall, chairman of the NTSB).
118 See id. ("[A] irline -influenced regulatory language often leftjumbo-jet-sized
loopholes that allowed carriers to put off changes for years.").
119 See id.
120 Id.
121 See Dave Lenckus, Liability Limits Still Up in Air: Amendment Would Modernize,
Harmonize Airline Liability Law, Bus. INS., May 18, 1998, at 3; see also Convention
for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air,
Oct. 12, 1929, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Warsaw Convention]. Pursuant to
Article 22(1), "Di]n the carriage of passengers the liability of the carrier for each
passenger is limited to the sum of 125,000 francs .... Nevertheless, by special
contract, the carrier and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability."
Id.
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limit to $75,000 per passenger and to waive the "necessary meas-
ures" defense. 122
Unfortunately, the Montreal Agreement is not the only mea-
sure the aviation industry has taken regarding the issue of liabil-
ity. Other nations and airline groups over the past thirty-two
years have also addressed liability.123 These uncoordinated ef-
forts led to a "'multiplicity' of liability limits worldwide."124
Thanks to the International Air Transport Association (IATA)
"intercarrier" agreement, integrating the myriad of liability pro-
visions may soon become a moot effort for the legal community,
because under the IATA agreement, most of the world's airlines
have waived the Warsaw Convention $75,000 per passenger lia-
bility limit.' 25 The intercarrier agreement was drafted in 1995 in
response to public pressure and has since been signed by most
carriers. 126 Wanda Potrykus, an IATA spokeswoman, character-
ized the overwhelming air carrier participation as "a voluntary
signal from the airlines that they are willing to have liability
cases judged under stricter liability rules." 27
This new system will break down the uniformity of an interna-
tional system developed in 1929. Under the old system, survi-
vors had to show willful misconduct to avoid liability limits and
collect more than $75,000.128 By waiving liability limits, the air-
lines are hoping to avoid the tedious trials that were an inevita-
ble part of pre-intercarrier agreement litigation.129
122 See Lenckus, supra note 121, at 3; see also, Warsaw Convention, supra note
121, Article 20(1) ("The carrier is not liable if he proves that he and his agents
have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible
for him or them to take such measures.").
123 See Lenckus, supra note 121, at 3.
124 Id.
125 See Peter Kaplan, Relatives Will Find It Easier to Win Damage Claims; Global
Accord Avoids Long Court Fight, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1998, at A12.
126 See id. The Warsaw Treaty forced people to settle for less money, because
the burden of proof was so heavy. Accordingly, many cases settled for a fraction
of their full value. The plight this caused for victims' families cast both the War-
saw Convention and the airlines in a bad light. James Kreindler, a New York
attorney who represents families of 80 TWA Flight 800 victims said, "[y]ou can't
defend it .... Everyone knew it wasn't fair." Id.
127 Id.; see also Matthew L. Wald, 12 U.S. Airlines Waive Limit on Liabilities, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 9, 1997, at 3. [hereinafter U.S. Airlines Waive] (listing the major air-
lines that signed the intercarrier agreement: American Airlines, Continental Air-
lines, Delta Air Lines, Hawaiian Airlines, Northwest Airlines, Trans World
Airlines, United Airlines, and USAir).
128 See U.S. Airlines Waive, supra note 127, at 3.
129 See id.
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Although the new liability system may become more uniform
as additional airlines sign on,1"' the current legal consequences
of the limitation waiver are unclear.1"' The only certainty now is
that "[a] revolution has taken place... that is both monumental
and all to the public good. 13 2
The most inconsistent aspect of the intercarrier agreement is
determining the applicable law of the passenger's domicile. 13
The manner in which domicile is determined can have signifi-
cant financial consequences for plaintiffs.13 4 Regarding the in-
tercarrier agreement, this is a particularly troublesome area
because despite airlines talking about it as one agreement, it is
actually three separate agreements. 1 5 The intercarrier agree-
ment consists of the IATA Intercarrier Agreement on Passenger
Liability (IIA), the Agreement on Measures to Implement the
IATA Intercarrier Agreement (MIA), and the Provisions Imple-
menting the IATA Intercarrier Agreement (IPA).
Each agreement proposes that the law of the victim's domicile
be applied.1 36 According to IIA, "compensatory damages may
be determined and awarded by reference to the law of the domi-
cile of the passenger. '131 MIA, however, states that application
as an "option available to the carrier. 1 3 8 Finally, IPA is silent on
the MIA option, but states that "compensatory damages may be
determined by reference to the law of the domicile or perma-
nent residence of the passenger."3 9
Increasing the confusion and ambiguity surrounding the legal
consequences of the intercarrier agreement, not one agreement
bears the signature of each participating air carrier. For exam-
ple, American flag carriers have signed all three. Many IATA
carriers have signed IIA and MIA, while no carrier has signed
IPA. Finally, some air carriers, like Lufthansa, have not signed
130 See id.
13, See Lee S. Kreindler, Warsaw Convention Waivers: Goodbye to Liability Limita-
tions, AVIATION LITIG. REP., Apr. 8, 1997, at 24,668.
132 Id.
133 See id.
134 See Bill Coffin, Rough Air Ahead; Aviation Insurance Industry, BEST'S REV.-
PROP.-CAS. INS. EDITION, Mar. 1997, at 88 ("The average liability per passenger
fatality within American jurisdiction is about $2 million.").







any agreement.1 4 ' Accordingly, which airlines have signed
which agreements is questionable and any difference thereof ef-
fects domicile law determination from carrier to carrier.
While the liability limitation waiver may currently be a source
of uncertainty in specific litigation,14 its effect on the direction
of air carrier liability is clear. The industry is now a "no-fault
absolute liability system. ' 142 Eliminating the $75,000, the War-
saw Convention damage cap was not intended to effect that
change. The idea was merely to replace the incredibly difficult
willful misconduct burden with a negligence standard. 4
The IATA agreement's evisceration of the fault system is un-
fortunate and potentially detrimental. Since plaintiffs' lawyers
no longer have to prove willful misconduct or negligence, they
probably will not attempt to do so. 44 This is a definite negative,
because the fault system has materially contributed to higher
standards of safety in aviation.1 4 5
Changing the framework within which the aviation industry
has traditionally operated will affect not only plaintiffs and air
carriers, but insurers and aircraft manufactures as well. In par-
ticular, plaintiffs filing separate suits against air carriers and
manufacturers present "double-recovery" problems.1 46 This is
because the intercarrier agreement, allowing for unlimited lia-
bility, does not constitute law or a legal judgment. Although it is
partly law, the intercarrier agreement is primarily a contract
among airlines to pay unlimited liability damages.147
To understand how the intercarrier agreement's contractual
basis leaves the door for double recovery open to plaintiffs, con-
sider a plausible course of litigation. Suppose a plaintiff recov-
140 See id.
141 See Kaplan, supra note 125, at A12 ("Lawyers in the Flight 800 case are still
arguing over whether TWA should be subject to the Warsaw Convention.").
142 Kreindler, supra note 131, at 24,668.
143 See id. (giving examples of when the willful misconduct standard could or
was met). The only situation in which an airline could possibly show that it "took
all necessary measures to prevent the damage" is if a missile was fired by a non-
airline source. Id. This may seem a preposterous example, but in only one case
has an airline sustained an Article 20(1) defense. Melvin Belli, seeking damages
in excess of the Warsaw limit, informed the jury that he would "rather have noth-





147 See id. The liability Article 17 of the Warsaw convention places on air carri-
ers is law. The intercarrier agreement, however, is not-it is contract. See id.
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ers from an airline. The intercarrier agreement prevents
neither the airlines nor the insurer from seeking indemnifica-
tion or contribution from the manufacturers. 14 To contest pos-
sible liability for indemnification or contribution, a
manufacturer is free to assert that the airline's payment to the
plaintiff was voluntary and in no way provides any effective re-
course against it. This is, however, a double-edged sword be-
cause, should the plaintiff sue the manufacturer in addition to
the airline, the plaintiff could, in turn, claim that the manufac-
turer is not entitled to a "setoff" for damages the airline paid.149
Such a situation may further complicate the settlement pro-
cess. If an insurer makes a "decent offer," but requests a release
for the airline and the manufacturer, the plaintiffs attorney is
not likely to recommend the deal to her client.15 ° The result
may be scenarios in which an airline makes a fair offer but insists
on a general release that the passenger or his family refuses to
give because the passenger wants punitive damages from the
manufacturer or double recovery. 151
Thus, the possibilities for potential liability under the inter-
carrier agreement are tremendous. To aircraft manufacturers
blamed for deaths and injuries, these enormous costs include
millions of dollars payable to victims and their families in addi-
tion to millions more pending a product recall and or repair,
not to mention the "incalculable cost of damaged reputa-
tion." '152 Even for the most safety conscious airlines, these are
real risks that effect them individually and the aviation industry
in general.1 5 1
148 See Kreindler, supra note 131, at 24,668.
149 See id. The plaintiff can claim that the airline payment was pursuant to an
intercarrier contract to which he was a third-party beneficiary. The plaintiff may
then argue that as such, the payment was neither a matter of law nor a legal
judgment. Thus, any monies paid were collateral and no different from pay-
ments under a life or accident insurance policy, other collateral sources for
which a tortfeasor may not claim credit. See id.
150 See id.
151 See id.
152 Acohido, supra note 92, at Al.
153 See Dave Lenckus, Swissair Crash Unlikely to Turn Aviation Market, Bus. INS.,
Sept. 14, 1998, at 1 [hereinafter Swissair Crash] ("Claims stemming from the Sept.
2 Swissair crash could consume more than 70% of this year's worldwide aviation
insurance premiums ... ); see also Edwin Unsworth, Airline Captive Insurer to Bear
Swissair Claims, Bus. INS., Sept. 7, 1998, at 1 (stating that this was Swissair's first
fatal accident since October 1979); Kaplan, supra note 125, at A12 ("Air safety
experts consider [Swissair] one of the most tightly run carriers in the world.").
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With the global aviation insurance industry losing money
every year since 1988,154 the Swissair crash may only be a glimpse
of how the intercarrier agreement liability limit waiver may ef-
fect aviation insurers. This is an especially acute concern any-
time American jurisdiction is an issue.1 55 For example, market
executives predict that the reserve needed to cover Swissair's po-
tential liability could reach half a billion dollars, because a high
.number of professionals were among the 229 passengers and
crew members killed in the crash.15 6
Passenger volume is expected to triple during the next twenty
years and some members of the aviation industry consider large
aircrafts the best way to meet this expanded demand for air
travel. 157 By 2010, this increased air traffic could produce com-
mercial air accidents at a rate of fifty-three incidents per year.1 58
Combining these factors with unlimited liability presents a stag-
gering future for the aviation industry.159
Table 2 lists passenger fatalities for United States airlines from
1983 to 1996.160
III. OTHER TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY
FATIGUE RESPONSES
The aviation industry is not the only transportation industry
in which fatigue is a growing problem. Both the railway and
trucking industries have had to grapple with increasing con-
154 See Coffin, supra note 134, at 88.
155 See id. Even before the Warsaw Convention liability limits were waived,
American courts have always tended to look favorably upon claimants while other
courts interpreted the limits more strictly. In fact, "[s]ome (insurers) have specif-
ically declined to provide coverage to (airlines) .. .that fly planes carrying more
than 250 Americans. They just don't want to touch those kinds of risks." Id.
156 See Swissair Crash, supra note 153, at 1.
157 See Coffin, supra note 134, at 88.
158 See Brent E. Dyer, Risk Management and Its Application to Air Carrier Safety, 62
J. AIR L. & COM. 491, 492 (1996) (citing, Robert G. Knowles, Airline-Crash Preven-
tion Seen as Needed, NAT'L. UNDERWRITER, PROP. & CAs.-RiSK & BENEFITS MGMT.,
Nov. 28, 1994, at 21).
159 For example, the average number of persons to die per crash from 1983 to
1996 was 65. See Coffin, supra note 134, at 88. Multiplying 65 by 53 to make a
rough estimate of the number of people who could reasonably be expected to die
within the year 2010 yields 3,445 as the number of deaths per year. Now multiply
3,445 by two million dollars (the average liability per passenger fatality). See id.
134, at 88. Thus, a conservative estimate of potential liability for the industry is
$6,890,000,000. This number could easily be inflated by unlimited liability, be-
cause the two million dollar average recovery per passenger death may soar.
160 See Coffin, supra note 134, at 88 (using data from the NTSB). See Appendix
for Table 2.
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sumer demand and the subsequent effects of employee fatigue.
Although not in identical fashions, fatigue's devastating effects
have compelled each industry to respond.
A. TRUCKING
Mark D. Gunther, president and owner of Gunther's Trans-
port Leasing, was sentenced to thirty months in prison because
he falsified and destroyed driver logbooks.' 61 In an uncommon
course of events, Gunther was convicted on two counts of per-
jury and Transport Leasing was fined $175,000 for its role in
conspiracy and making false statements. This marked the "first
instance of criminal statutes being applied to Department of
Transportation hours-of-service regulations.1' 62
U.S. District Court Judge William M. Nickerson sentenced
and fined Gunther far below the respective thirty-five years im-
prisonment and $1.3 million maximums. In so doing, however,
Judge Nickerson remarked that Gunther's Transport Leasing
was a "blatant abuser" of the hour-of-service regulations.'63
While Gunther got off relatively easy, this could be the dawn of a
new age in dealing with "abusers" of transportation service time
regulations.
Addressing the problem of hours-of-service violations and the
fatigue it causes in the trucking industry is directly related to
public safety. In fact, Gunther drivers have been responsible for
several fatigue influenced accidents. 164 Unfortunately, fatigue
related accidents are not solely limited to Gunther Transport,
but they are commonplace in the industry. 161
161 SeeJohn D. Schulz, Are Shippers the Next Target? Conviction for Hours-of-Service
Violations Sends Maryland Truck Owner to Prison, TRAFFic WORLD, Oct. 14, 1996, at
12.
162 Id. In the past, log-book violations were treated as civil, not criminal, cases.
The Gunther case was an extraordinary culmination of a four year Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation and DOT investigation. The resulting conviction gave an
unmistakable warning to trucking companies and their drivers that hours-of-ser-
vice violations will no longer receive a wink and a nod. See id.
163 Id.
164 See id. In September 1995, a driver killed one passenger riding in the truck
and injured several construction workers. In 1993, a Gunther truck crashed after
its driver fell asleep at the wheel. An investigation revealed the driver had been
working 20 hours straight before the crash. See id.
165 See id.
Gunther's conviction represents an attempt to rectify the fa-
tigue problem within the trucking industry. 66 This, however,
may be a difficult order to fill because the trucking "culture"
routinely forces drivers to exceed hours-of-service rules.
167
Nonetheless, the FHWA has begun the groundwork to revise
these rules in an effort to combat the hours-of-service violation
problem. 168
,Currently, the FHWA is considering extending the ten-hour
commercial truck driving limitation to fourteen-hours, followed
by a ten-hour rest period.169 The Senate Surface Transportation
Subcommittee remained unconvinced that this "one-rest-period-
fits-all policy" is the best approach "when scientific evidence
points to varying sleep and rest requirements among
humans." 7 0 Dr. Mark Rosekind, an adviser to the United States'
space-travel program, supports these concerns because he feels
"none of the existing hours-of-service strictures reflect the
known and well established scientific knowledge regarding fa-
tigue. '' 17 1 The reason all of these concerns are valid is that the
human body is complex and not easily amenable to arbitrarily
set rest-duty regulations.
Because the human body is complex, focusing solely on regu-
latory duty-rest specifications is a very myopic view of the fatigue
problem. According to Chuck Dettmann, AAR's executive vice
166 See id. The Federal Highway Administration-sponsored truck/bus safety
summit cited fatigue as the biggest dilemma, and according to the NTSB, fatigue
is a factor in at least 30% of all truck accidents. See id.
167 See Schultz, supra note 161, at 12. During the trial, many of Gunther's driv-
ers testified that they were "forced to drive as many as 19 hours straight in order
to meet unrealistic shipping schedules." Id.
168 See id. The rules, which have not been revised in 57 years, limit drivers to 10
hours behind the wheel and 15 hours on duty before a mandatory 8-hour rest
period. Thomas J. Donohue, president of the American Trucking Associations
(ATA), thinks flexibility is needed. Drivers should be allowed to sleep when they
are tired, drive when alert, and not be forced to adhere to mandatory federal
regulations. " 'The current hours-of-service regulations go against the body's nat-
ural rhythms and its needs for sleep .... There is no creature on this earth who
can work 10 hours, sleep eight and work 10 more again, no matter what the
occupation is."' Id. (quoting Todd Spencer, director of Owner Operator In-
dependent Drivers Association).
169 See Frank N. Wilner, Driving Hours Extension?, TRAFic WORLD, Sept. 21,
1998, at 18.
170 Id. Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison, Subcommittee Chairman, exclaimed "it
is time to substitute proven scientific theory and demonstrated technology for
the pseudo-science and myths that long have influenced federally imposed on-
duty limits." Id.
171 Id.
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president for safety and operations, "[n] o legislative, regulatory
or corporate measure can make employees devote their time to
resting. ' 172 Federal Railroad AdministratorJolene Molitoris rec-
ognized this truth and initiated a joint labor-management ap-
proach to combat fatigue. 173 This type of problem solving,
which veers from the duty-rest specifications paradigm to em-
brace practical considerations and scientific evidence, may not
eliminate fatigue from twenty-four hour transportation opera-
tions, but it can certainly help to more effectively manage this
difficult safety challenge.1 74
B. RAILWAY
1. United States
By 1994, increased demands within the railway industry began
to push the limits of existing duty-rest regulations. Ronald P.
McLaughlin, then Chairman of the Railway Labor Executives'
Association and locomotive engineer of thirty-eight years, urged
Congress to pass a law allowing locomotive engineers and other
operating personnel at least one day off per week.1 75 McLaugh-
lin stated:
Under current law, a railroad company may work its engineers
up to 112 hours each week. It is indefensible that one of the
most safety-sensitive and dangerous transport modes should re-
quire train crews to report to work when they are fatigue-im-
paired. For the sake of public safety, Congress should bite the
bullet and legislate what is needed-regular reporting times for
employees and one day of uninterrupted rest. 16
McLaughlin's plea, surely a product of experience, gave voice
to the underlying problems that had begun to infect the railway
industry and undermine public safety. One railroad company
tragically familiar with the effects of fatigue on safety is Union
Pacific (UP). After a number of fatal collisions in 1997, the Fed-
eral Railroad Administration (FRA) announced UP had "a fun-
172 Id.
173 See id. The North American Rail Alertness Partnership is an illustration of
this concept. It "stresses employee education and training, predictable days off
and work breaks during which naps are encouraged." Id.
174 See id.
175 See For National Rail Summit: Veteran Locomotive Engineer Itemizes Public Safety




damental breakdown in basic railroad operating procedures and
practices essential to a safe operation." '177
Accordingly, the FRA began an "unprecedented review" of
UP. 178 This review followed the third in a series of fatal acci-
dents that began in June of 1997 and continued throughout the
FRA's increased scrutiny of UP. 17 9 Widespread employee fatigue
greatly concerned the FRA. It found "significant evidence" of
inefficient crew use that directly lead to crew fatigue, stress, vio-
lations of the hours-of-service law, and reduced ability to comply
with operating rules.18 °
UP was apparently willing to cast a blind eye on the risks of
employee fatigue and reduced safety in operating while it kept
an eagle eye on the bottom line. James Brunkenhoefer, na-
tional legislative director for the United Transportation Union,
said "some problems on UP had been exacerbated by prosper-
ity."1 81 In fact, the local union had been raising the fatigue issue
for five years before the FRA review without any success. Even
after the FRA's UP review report, the local union still felt safety
was a lower priority than "corporate profits 'at any cost.' "182
UP President, Jerry Davis, tried to explain its 1997 troubles by
pointing to overall industry conditions, 183 but nonetheless made
the assurance that "[fiatigue and stress of our train crews are
critical safety concerns. '  Thus, UP, in partnership with rail
177 Jack Burke, ERA Sends UP to Woodshed, TRAeic WORLD, Sept. 15, 1997, at 8.
178 Id.
179 See id.
180 Id. ("Crews are needlessly working longer hours without getting time off.
Cumulative fatigue erodes train and engine service employees' ability to perform
their duties safely. When crews work erratic schedules for days on end, their
ability to read and follow instructions, identify and comply with signals, react ap-
propriately in emergency situations and make safety-critical decisions and act on
those decisions is lost.").
181 Id.
182 Id.; see also Rip Watson, Teamsters Enter Row Over Safety Conditions at UP, J.
COM., Sept. 16, 1997, at 16A ("Union Pacific Railroad... is a 'Valujet waiting to
happen'").
183 See A View from the Top; U.S. and Canadian Leaders Consider 1997 and 1998
Railway and COO Industry Directions, RALWAY AGE, Dec. 1997, at 27. According to
Jerry R. Davis, president and COO of Union Pacific, "few railroads have ever
faced the problems that confronted UP in the latter part of 1997, a fact obvious
to all in and out of the industry." Id. BNSF President and CEO, Robert D. Krebo,
stated that "our industry is coping with the greatest demands for rail shipments in
its history and, at the same time, perhaps the most serious rail service problems
that shippers in the western U.S. have ever experienced." Id.
184 Union Pacific Introduces Guaranteed Time Off Program for Train Crews, PR NEw-
swiPE, Oct. 30, 1997.
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labor unions and the FRA, voluntarily introduced a "guaran-
teed" time off program. 8 5 The question remains whether this
"voluntary" initiative adequately addresses the fatigue and safety
problems of UP specifically, and the railroad industry in
general.18
6
When FRA Administrator Jolene Molitoris announced the UP
time off agreement at a hearing before the Federal Surface
Transportation Board in Washington, she emphasized the im-
portance of safe service for the railway industry: "We must never
forget that safety and service are inextricably linked .... The
most critical safety issues facing UP train crews today are fatigue
and stress caused by long hours, many consecutive work days
without a break, and the unpredictability of work schedules." 18 7
The two safety audits FRA performed at UP, the nation's larg-
est railroad, between August 23, 1997 and November 7, 1997,
identified several operational problems within UP. They in-
clude: (1) a corporate culture with varying attitudes toward
safety; (2) inadequate staffing and an insufficient crew manage-
ment system; and (3) lack of training and extreme work over-
load."8 UP, its labor organizations, and the FRA initiated the
following steps to address the aforementioned concerns: (1)
modify the corporate culture by re-emphasizing "safety first," (2)
increase staffing through an "aggressive hiring plan," and (3)
reduce fatigue by guaranteeing a right to time off and a compre-
hensive fatigue mitigation program. 8 9
The problems UP faced in 1997 resulted in particularized
remedies for its collision-plagued railroad, as well as fueling rail
labor to lobby Congress to press the FRA for "a firm delivery
date on a rulemaking covering fatigue. '"' 9° FRA, rail manage-
ment, and labor unions seem to agree that a correlation exists
185 See id. It grants "any train and engine service employee who works on 14
consecutive calendar days without taking extra time off... the absolute right to
voluntarily layoff for up to 48 hours." Id.
186 See BLE, Union Pacific to Implement Plan for Better Safety, PR NEWSWIRE, Oct.
27, 1997. Preliminary indications may warrant a negative response to this ques-
tion. "In spite of a 24 hour-a-day, 14 day safety audit of UP in September," colli-
sions, derailments and backlog problems have persisted. Id.
187 Id. Fatigue management, which includes a new group formed to address
job fatigue to study all aspects of work-rest cycles, including crew scheduling, was
a critical component of the initiative. See id.
188 See Progress Noted on UP Safety Assurance Measures; FRA Releases Safety Report on
Union Pacific Railroad Audit, PR NEWSWIRE, Feb. 25, 1998.
189 Id.
190 Frank N. Wilner, Tackling Rail Safety, TRAric WORLD, Apr. 6, 1998, at 13.
between accidents and work cycles.191 Accordingly, eliminating
operating crew fatigue is emerging as a principal issue in con-
gressional reauthorization of a federal rail safety program. 19 2
In 1997,Jim Oberstar, D-Minn., and Bob Wise, D-W.Va., intro-
duced the Rail Safety Reform Act, which would prohibit rotating
shifts shown to "wreak havoc on biological clocks.' 193 Addition-
ally, the Act would "provide for more advance notice of work
assignments, more rest between duty calls, more restful places to
sleep while away from home and more undisturbed time at
home."1 94 Oberstar and Wise believe the Act would "streamline
regulatory review of new safety rules... and reduce accidents by
allowing more rest for train crews." 195
2. Canada
The United States is not alone in its recent efforts to improve
the safety of its railways. Canada has made some groundbreak-
ing discoveries in the area of fatigue and railway safety. The Ca-
nadian Alertness Assurance Program (CANALERT '95) provides
a novel understanding of various factors that influence train-
crew fatigue and alertness. 96
CANALERT '95 is a joint management-labor initiative, the
first of its kind in the world rail industry, that has spawned en-
thusiastic responses and piqued the interest of the transporta-
tion industry. Ed Dodge, a rail industry executive vice-president
of operations, said CANALERT '95 "gives railways a new bench-
mark for performance."197 Fortunately, the initiative's princi-
ples do not end with the railroad industry, but are universally
applicable. 98
19, See id. (stating that railway employee fatigue is responsible for as many as




195 Rip Watson, House Bill Seeks Rail Safety Rules; Democratic Sponsors Envision
Streamlined Reviews and Additional Inspectors for Industry, J. CoM., Sept. 12, 1997, at
13A. Created in response to the rash of UP and other fatal rail accidents, the
"bill mandates eight hours of undisturbed rest for train crews that now are regu-
larly interrupted during off-duty hours." Id. It requires train crews to receive 10
hours of rest after 10 hours of work, bans night-time split shifts, and provides for
24 consecutive hours off duty at least once a week. See id.
196 See Canadian Railways Combat On-the-Job Fatigue in Landmark Scientific Study,
PR NEWSWIRE, May 30, 1996 [hereinafter Canadian Railways].
197 Id.
19 See id. "This project is a scientific advance that could benefit railway em-
ployees and their families for many years to come. As well, it has the potential to
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CANALERT '95 is so progressive and visionary because it
dares to move beyond set industry paradigms. Its countermea-
sures are an alternative to the "traditional regulatory approach
to rail safety, under which hours-of-work rules are arbitrarily pre-
scribed in federal legislation and collective bargaining agree-
ments."199 This method of duty/rest time regulation is simply
not adequate to accommodate the physiological causes of
fatigue.
The project was conducted within a five-month period during
actual operating conditions. 20 0 By analyzing the resulting physi-
ological and subjective data collected, "researchers identified
the root causes of train-crew fatigue and designed countermea-
sures to enhance on-track alertness." 20 1 Some of the counter-
measures tested during the pilot project were regular work
schedules, new sleep strategies, locomotive cab audio systems,
and customized "lifestyle" training.20 2
These CANALERT '95 countermeasures helped the railway
industry successfully respond to years of government pressure to
benefit shift workers in many fields around the world." Id. The railway industry
has participated in a project with "wide-ranging potential for workplace improve-
ment, not only in [its] own industry, but in many other round-the-clock work
environments, including the air, marine and trucking industries." Id.
199 Id.
200 See id. (stating that researchers monitored the alertness levels of locomotive
engineers at work and at rest, gathering data from EEG (brain wave) and EKG
(heart rate) recorders).
201 Id.
202 See Canadian Railways, supra note 196. The fatigue counter measures tested
include:
" Regular train-crew work schedules. With standardized time pools, or
shifts, engineers developed regular work/rest and sleep/wake patterns,
promoting increased on-the-job alertness and improved health and
quality of life.
" Radical new sleep strategies. During the study, locomotive engineers
respond favorably to en-route naps, sleeping for up to 20 minutes while
their trains were stopped in sidings. As well, tests proved the benefits of
strategic napping before and after duty.
* Locomotive Cab Audio Systems. Engineers tested headsets that block
out locomotive noise and provide music stimulation during train runs.
The music automatically cut out when engineers were communicating
by radio with conductors or rail traffic controllers.
* Customized 'lifestyle' training for crews and their families, a counseling
program that covered such shiftwork issues as the biological clock, sleep
habits, nutrition and family relationships.
combat crew fatigue. 20 3 Help arrived not a moment too soon.
Human error accounts for about seventy-five percent of all train
accidents, and railways have been seeking ways to lower that
number.20 4 Implementing the countermeasures "decreased fa-
tigue, improved train crew alertness and reduced employee
absenteeism."2 o5
IV. THE AVIATION INDUSTRY'S RESPONSE TO FATIGUE
The American aviation industry has not produced a corollary
to CANALERT '95. However, Mark Rosekind, Ph.D. and fellow
researchers in the NASA Ames Research Center initiated a Fa-
tigue Countermeasures Program (FCP). Launched in 1980,
FCP has had three stated goals: "(1) To determine the extent of
fatigue, sleep loss and circadian disruption in flight operations,
(2) To determine the effect of these factors on flightcrew per-
formance, and (3) To develop and evaluate countermeasures to
reduce adverse effects of these factors and to maximize flight-
crew performance and alertness."20 6 The study's practical result
is scientific findings that destroy the myth that pilots and air-
crews have "endless endurance and ability to sustain alertness
indefinitely. 2 7
The NASA countermeasures include planned napping, caf-
feine use, and using replacement crews on extended-range
trips.20 8 These initial published results added "substantially to
the general knowledge of how urgent the need is for adequate
rest in many aviation operations" and helped prompt FAA pro-
posed revised flight and duty-time standards. 9 Unfortunately,
the resulting notice of proposed rulemaking at the end of 1995
satisfied no one.210
203 See Alex Binkley, Canadian Study Tests Ways to Stop Train Engineers' Fatigue,
TRAic WoRLD, June 10, 1996, at 5.
2 4 See id. This is a frightening statistic, especially considering the fact that the
NTSB has found that in many of its train accident investigations, in which fatigue
was a factor or cause, that train crews were in full compliance with federally im-
posed rest requirements. See supra note 169, at 18.
205 Binkley, supra note 203, at 5.




210 See New Fight/Duty Time Proposal to Focus on 'Reserve' Issue, WEEKLY OF Bus.
AVIATION, May 4, 1998, at 195; see also Pilots' Coalition Reports Safety Support, But No
Promises, on Capital Hill, AVIATION DAILY, Sept. 23, 1997, at 522. The Coalition of
Airline Pilot Associations (CAPA) is "concerned that the FAA has taken no action
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Because the FAA failed to act on the notice of proposed
rulemaking the agency issued in 1995, pilots complain that they
have been working under rules mostly unchanged since the
1930's and are lobbying for new flight and duty time restric-
tions.211 Pilots are facing particular difficulty with international
flights, because essentially, "no federal maximum duty-time reg-
ulations .. .cover international service. 2 12 Even in the face of
antiquated and non-existent regulations, the CAPA still has an
uphill battle ahead of it.
The first thing they must do is galvanize enough pilots to sup-
port the new duty and flight-time regulations. This may be eas-
ier said than done because the "culture of aviators has been one
of superiority and invincibility. 2 13  While some pilots may
"cling" to this myth and "culture," researchers know otherwise;
nobody is immune to the deleterious effects of fatigue. 214
In fact, testing in recent years has clearly documented fa-
tigue's "deleterious effects.., on performing complicated tasks
as well as on judgment. 2 1' These tests further support and doc-
ument that flying and fatigue are a dangerous combination.21 6
Fatigue degrades every aspect of human capability, everything
imaginable, including decision making and reaction time. 211
Pat Andrews, manager of global aircraft services for Mobil
Business Resources Corporation, who chaired the Fatigue Coun-
termeasures Task Force, said the aviation industry has to be
on flight and duty time, nor on test regulations, since June 1996 when public
comment closed on the notice of proposed rulemaking." Id.
211 See Airline Pilot Coalition Seeks Support for Fight and Duty Time Restrictions,
WEEKLY OF Bus. AVtATON, Sept. 29, 1997, at 136; see also Pilots Name "Most Needed"
Safety Improvements, AIR SAFETY WEEK, Sept. 22, 1997, at 38. According to Rich
Lavoy, president of the Allied Pilots Association, "[w]e are working under an anti-
quated system of rules that were written in the 1930s and changed very little
since, in spite of what we now know about the limitations of human perform-
ance." Id.
212 Kevin G. Hall, Fine Air Pilots Elaborate on Representation Effort, J. CoM., Aug.
27, 1997, at 14A.
213 Parke, supra note 206, at 64; see also Mal Gormley, Dealing With Discord, Bus.
& COM. AVIATION, Sept. 1997, at 94. The norm in the aviation industry is a "can-
do" attitude-to be supermen and superwomen-that is influenced by a "huge
concern about not disappointing the customer." Id.
214 See A Wake-Up Call on Fatigue, Bus. & COM. AVIATION, Jan. 1996, at 28.
215 Id.
216 See Lester Reingold, Of Men and Machines; Human-Factors Analysis is Enjoying
Increased Emphasis in Aviation. And Not Only in the Cockpit, AIR TRANSP. WORLD,
Sept. 1992, at 84.
217 See Parke, supra note 206, at 64.
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"proactive... on anything that degrades performance.121 "One
of the most helpful findings of the FCP" on this issue is the "ben-
eficial effect of planned napping. ' 219 However, "naps must be
short (less than thirty minutes) and scheduled in advance" to be
safe and effective.22 °
Unfortunately, controlled rest is not currently sanctioned in
the United States. 221 Therefore, although it may provide a sig-
nificant benefit, controlled rest is "not a panacea for all fatigue-
related problems in the cockpit."22 2 As humans, limitations to
our performance exist that are purely a reflection of our physio-
logical capabilities and are independent of training, motivation,
and experience.
Simply put, according to the NASA analysis, "[t]here is no
easy 'cure' to fatigue issues in aviation operations. "223 "The only
known way to recover from their lack of sleep is to sleep. 224
Sleep is an "absolutely essential" physiological need that in the
"24-hour world of aviation" becomes a lower priority than being
on time. 2 5 These efforts to remain awake and maintain a timely
schedule may be noble. It's important, however, to remember
that despite efforts to dodge sleep, when the body needs sleep, it
will do what it can to initiate short episodes of sleep, or attempt
to pass into a longer state of sleep.226
These sleep realities are forcing the aviation industry to look
even further for solutions than "NASA naps." "One of the strate-
gies being considered for long-haul crews . . . is isolating or
'quarantining' crews the day before a flight in order to provide
the opportunity for maximum rest. '227 The NTSB suggests that
even "off-duty hours must be 'managed' with a view toward
flight safety. 228
218 Linda L. Martin, Fending Off Fatigue, Bus. & COM. AVIATION, Nov. 1997, at
70.
219 Parke, supra note 206, at 64. ("Short naps can consistently increase alert-
ness for as long as several hours.") These suggested scheduled rest periods have
been dubbed "NASA Naps." See Reingold, supra note 216, at 84.
220 Parke, supra note 206, at 64.
221 See id.
222 Reingold, supra note 216, at 84.
223 Richard 0. Reinhart, M.D., Alertness Management, Bus. & COM. AVIATION,
June 1995, at 84.
224 Parke, supra note 206, at 64.
225 Reinhart, supra note 223, at 84.
226 See id.
227 Parke, supra note 206, at 84.
228 Richard N. Aarons, Examining the Causal Factors, Bus. & CoM. AVIATION,
Nov. 30, 1995, at 102. The NTSB made this observation after the April 29, 1993
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Dr. Rosekind, although in a non-regulatory, neutral, scientific
position, feels "the ultimate benefits of the research are that
safer, more thoughtful scheduling and flight- and duty-time
standards will be established."229 This may be a misplaced feel-
ing, because the study upon which it is based has been criti-
cized.23 ° Though the Air Transport Association (ATA) lauded
Rosekind and NASA's Ames Research Center as having been "in-
strumental in supplying data," it does not believe regulation is
the best use of the information. The ATA believes the counter-
measures studies are best used to help pilots by educating them
about the type of rest required.2 3'
The criticism FCP has faced may be due in large part to un-
derlying economic motivations. According to the National Air
Transportation Association (NATA), Regional Airline Associa-
tion, and Air Transport Association, the FAA's flight and duty
time proposal is "unworkable" and "economically cata-
strophic. ' 23 2 At an estimated implementation cost of $1.97 bil-
lion, NATA told the FAA that its proposal "is unjustified as a
preventative fatigue countermeasure, is operationally unwork-
able for the industry on which it is proposed, . . . and is unen-
forceable in the manner in which the provisions were
drafted. "233
V. CONCLUSION
Rapidly evolving technology has stretched the limits of avia-
tion regulations that were enacted decades ago and have re-
mained substantially unchanged. As pilots push themselves to
crash of Continental Express EMB-120RT in Pine Bluff, Arkansas, because fatigue
induced by the flightcrew's failure to properly manage their given rest periods
contributed to the accident. See id.
229 Parke, supra note 206, at 64.
230 See generally, Not All Criticism of Flight/Duty Proposal is Deserved, AIR SAFETY
WEEK, July 1, 1996, at 27. "Although there is a sound, scientific basis for regulat-
ing the length of a pilot's work day," sound airline and pilot groups say the FAA
misapplied research to justify the regulation. Id. The airlines have criticized the
science itself: "There is no scientific evidence in published studies that fatigue
causes operationally-significant performance problems." Id.
231 Airlines Criticize Study on Pilot Fatigue, AEROSPACE DAILY, Apr. 13, 1994, at 71.
232 Airline Associations Blast FAA 's Flight and Duty Time Proposal WEEKLY OF Bus.
AVIATION, June 24, 1996, at 279.
233 Id.; see also NATA Sees 'Ruin'for On-Demand Operators in Duty Time Rules, AVIA-
TION DAILY, June 21, 1996, at 483. NATA estimates that the FAA's proposed
flight-duty-time rules could bring "financial ruin" to its segment of the industry.
"[C]harter pilots would lose $617 million in "pay" and "increased costs and lost
revenues would combine for a loss of $6.5 billion to implement the rules." Id.
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maintain their "invincible superman" culture in the face of ever
increasing flight demands, fatigue is becoming a veritable
cryptonite.
While the aviation industry has recognized the need to
change some of its oldest policies, it has been incapable of mak-
ing similar strides in the field of duty time regulation. This
seems a bit puzzling in that the industry explicitly acknowledges
the inextricable link between pilot fatigue and consumer safety.
Nonetheless, revised duty and rest time regulations have been
stalled since 1995 and do not currently appear to be near
resolution.
Although the United States has studied fatigue and counter-
measures just as its Canadian sister has, it has not been as suc-
cessful in implementing FCP findings. At the nebulous core of
this standstill is the ever-present economic factor of revision and
change. No one wants exhaustion and fatigue to be intrinsic job
characteristics for pilots, but few people are thrilled with in-
creasing airline operating costs by billions of dollars to imple-
ment more responsive fatigue solutions.
Faced with the daunting problems of ineffective antiquated
regulations, financially impractical new regulations, and unlim-
ited liability in the face of growing pilot fatigue problems, the
aviation industry must take a decisive step soon. The safety of its
consumers and potential viability of the industry may very well
hang in the balance.
2000]




No. of Duty period Flight time Minimum Reduced Rest hours Extended
Pilots hours hours rest rest 3 5  following dut3 6
hours hours reduced rest hours
(compensatory)
1 (part 135) NMT 14 NMT 8 10 9, may only 11 Up to 16
be reduced only if due
if duty peri- to opera-
od has not tional
exceeded 14 delays
2 NMT 14 NMT 10 10 9, may only 11 Up to 16
be reduced only if due
if duty peri- to opera-
od has not tional
exceeded 14 delays
3 NMT 16 NMT 12 14 12, may 16 Up to 18
only be only if due
reduced if to opera-
duty period tional
has not ex- delays
ceeded 16
3 Each pilot More than NMT 16 18 16, may 20 Up to 20
must have 16, but only be only if due
sleep oppor- NMT 18 reduced if to opera-
tunity and duty period tional





4 Each pilot More than NMT 18 22 20, may 24 Up to 26
must have 18 but only be only if due
sleep oppor- NMT 24 reduced if to opera-
tunity and duty period tional







234 See Flight Crewmember Duty Period Limitations, Flight Time Limitations
and Rest Requirements, 60 Fed. 65,951, 65,957 (1995) (to be codified at 14
C.F.R. pts. 121 and 135) (proposed Dec. 20, 1995).
235 Rest periods may be reduced only when the actual duty period does not
exceed the maximum scheduled duty period for that crew composition and if the
pilot is provided a compensatory rest period.
236 The flights to which the pilot is assigned must at block out time be ex-
pected to reach their destination within the extended duty period.
237 Applies only to duty periods with one or more flights that land or take off



















238 See Loffin, supra note 134, at 88.
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